According to Levinas, therefore, peace and justice require a break with the philosophies of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. In H. Pedersen & M. Altman (Eds. Sur les notions d’usage chez Wittgenstein et Heidegger. For as § 74 explains, our always already being immersed in a social world implies that a proper outlook on the temporality of existence is ultimately a collective undertaking. (2005). In this article I argue that Levinas can be read as a critic, not just of Heideggerian being, but also of being-with. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Levinas and Heidegger : The elemental confrontation. vii–xliii). Even if Heidegger does not uniquely hold the Weltjudentum responsible for this situation, it is clear that he wants to defend the local and particular in the face of what we would today call cosmopolitanism or globalization.Footnote 3 So if there is no such thing as a solitary subject for Heidegger, there is no such thing as a Mitsein, or at least an authentic Mitsein, that encompasses the whole of humanity either. Intersubjectivity and community. Humans are not only fecund but also engendered beings, he points out, and this makes them simultaneously one of a kind and irrevocably bound to their fellow men. Continental Philosophy Review, This title will be ab breviated henceforth as "DEHH". In my caring for both the life and death of the other, he no longer “equals his occupation” or “vested interest” (Levinas 1987/1998: 216), meaning that social relations are more profound than Heidegger acknowledges. booktitle = "The Oxford Handbook of Levinas", Australian Centre for Jewish Civilisation, Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding, Levinas and Heidegger: The elemental confrontation. It serves to break the spell of inauthentic being-with, but only to subsequently enable a true relation, not just to finitude, but also to one’s fellow men. Most of this article was written during a research stay at Princeton University; I would like to thank Thomas Trezise for his kind hospitality. Heidegger and politics: The ontology of radical discontent. non-occidental—“cultures” (1972/1987: 84); he accordingly regrets that contemporary phenomenology feels the need to “show the very excellence of Western culture to be culturally and historically conditioned” (1972/1987: 101).Footnote 25, In other words, Levinas’s all too hasty reading of Being and Time raises the question whether his anti-Mitsein account is not overly hasty as well, for it is not just in “‘Dying for…’” that he disregards Heidegger’s explicit denial that authentic being-with is impersonal and faceless. Was aber ist dies im Falle von Emmanuel Levinas? Heidegger (in itself harmlessly enough) argues against the idea of a solitary subject for whom the existence of other human beings is essentially irrelevant. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. Drabinski, J. E. (2011). De kritiek van Levinas op de fenomenologische traditie luidde dat er vanaf het begin geen ruimte was voor de Ander. Strangers and slaves in the land of Egypt: Levinas and the politics of otherness. Dastur, F. (2014). © 2021 Springer Nature Switzerland AG. Jahrhunderts. Information Philosophie - Levinas, Emmanuel (C - Le) www.information-philosophie.de Lieferbare philosophische Bücher STARTSEITE AUSGABEN AKTUELLES TEXTE ABOS UND EINZELHEFTE INFORMATIONEN KONTAKT ANZEIGENTARIFE Bernasconi, R. (2005). Quelques textes récents sur Husserl ont été ajoutés à la présente édition, sous le titre de « commentaires nouveaux ». Drabinski, J. E., & Nelson, E. S. (2014). Levinas here suggests that Dasein, rather than being subordinate to the socio-historical, is ultimately a solitary and egoistic being. Read this book using Google Play Books app on your PC, android, iOS devices. Emmanuel Levinas (1906 - 1995) zählt zu den bedeutendsten Denkern des 20. Unlike Guenther (2012), Critchley (2015) does not bring out this social aspect of Levinas’s analysis, focusing on the bounded nature of Levinasian subjectivity in a primarily (or more narrowly) bodily sense of the word. Center for Contemporary European Philosophy, Radboud University Nijmegen, Postbus 9103, 6500 HD, Nijmegen, The Netherlands, You can also search for this author in Being and Time describes das Man as concerning “not this one, not that one” but the undifferentiated “neuter” (Heidegger 1927/1962: 164) and contends that our subjection to it leads to an evening out of all differences between individuals. 207–218). In the third part of this article, I will show how these criticisms are reflected in Levinas’s main works. However, given Levinas’s argument that this distinguishes Judaism from both paganism and Christianity, which “continues to give piety roots” (1961/1990: 233f. (1998). Indeed, instead of emerging from a web of cultural references, the other shatters any background of familiarity: “The cultural meaning […] which, according to the phenomenological expression, reveals the horizons of this world […] is disturbed and jostled by another presence that is abstract” (Levinas 1972/1987: 95) or “without any cultural ornament” (Levinas 1972/1987: 96). And while Heidegger does not defend a biological concept of Volk-hood along National Socialist lines (Radloff 2007: 126–133Footnote 2; Trawny 2014: 59–69; Escudero 2015: 36–40; Malpas 2016: 5f. For according to Heidegger, he continues, authenticity is only accomplished when Dasein equally resolutely and solitarily faces its own death. I will explain that Levinasian subjectivity and alterity are precisely defined by their not belonging to a larger unity; to the extent that they are part of a multi-personal collectivity, this does not take the form of a traditional community. In A. Horowitz & G. Horowitz (Eds. Emmanuel Levinas (1992): Schwierige Freiheit, Frankfurt /M. In Entre nous. Caygill, H. (2005). If he takes the face-to-face to be a better starting point for understanding sociality than the Heideggerian shoulder-to-shoulder, he goes on to complicate the relation between the sole self and the singular other, making clear that it is not “forgetful of the universe” (Levinas 1961/1969: 213). Questioning Levinas on irresponsibility. AB - This chapter offers a comprehensive account of Levinas’s relation to Heidegger’s thought during the formative years of his philosophical development through to Totality and Infinity (1961). The delightful other: Portraits of the feminine in Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Levinas. Heidegger and the question of National Socialism: Disclosure and Gestalt. Trawny, P. (2014). In A. Dianda (Ed.). / Fagenblat, Michael Charles. Levinas, E. (1947/1987). Being and Time (J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson, Trans.). Five problems in Levinas’s view of politics and the sketch of a solution to them. The being-with of being-there. This is for instance the strategy followed by Nancy, who maintains that Heidegger never properly thought through his notion of Mitsein (see Nancy 2008) and himself offers an account of coexistence (in Nancy 2000, among others) according to which community is not a common being but the very fact of our being-together. Critchley, S. (2014). Die Spannung zwischen der Ontologie und der Ethik wurde das zentrale Thema seiner späteren Schriften: En découvrant l’existence avec Husserl et Heidegger(Paris 1947,3. Realizing that its existence is finite and that it has to confront this fact entirely by itself, the Heideggerian self comes to see the superficiality of the values that everyday being-with imposes, and is accordingly able to free itself from this dictatorship. He exists “‘prior to’ history and culture” (Levinas 1972/1987: 101; Bernasconi 2005: 8), as “Meaning and Sense” explicitly states. Zooming in on this aspect of Heidegger’s account, Levinas gives a highly individualistic interpretation of Heideggerian authenticity, and thereby of Dasein proper. This however does not mean that Levinas only acknowledges one-on-one relations. They point out that Levinas is not necessarily considered to be the most thorough reader of Heidegger. On Levinas’s reading, Heidegger immediately turns to (what he considers to be) the most solitary fact of human existence, and claims that authenticity can only be an achievement of Dasein all on its own: “An authenticity of the most proper being-able-to-be and a dissolution of all relations with the other!” (1987/1998: 214). By continuing you agree to the use of cookies. ), Levinas describes living among the elements as a matter of purposeless “enjoyment” (1961/1969: 110). 30(1), 76–87. It is, to return to the main focus of my article, this very embedded or enrooted perspective on human (co)existence that much of Levinas’s work is devoted to overcoming. ), Between Levinas and Heidegger (pp. An entirely new perspective on the social is accordingly required, Levinas maintains: “Against this collectivity of the side-by-side, I have tried to oppose the ‘I-you’ collectivity”: “a collectivity that is not a communion [but] the face-to-face without intermediary” (1947/1987: 93). Originary inauthenticity: On Heidegger’s Sein Und Zeit. See also Critchley (2004: 174, 175) (though unlike Critchley, I do not think that these problematic aspects of Levinas’s work are primarily a matter of “the passage from ethics to politics” (2004: 173); they are already at work in his decontextualized notion of the ethical relation itself). Arguing that this rests on a misreading of Being and Time, I will use this opportunity to raise questions about Levinas’s interpretation of Heidegger and about his alternative explanation of coexistence. As a result, and regardless of the differences that exist between Totality and Infinity and Otherwise than Being, the latter likewise argues for a self uncontaminated by history and community. Even so, Levinas points out, Heidegger is not exactly positive about being-with as it manifests itself on a daily basis. “Miteinandersein, too,” Levinas claims, “is a collectivity around something common” (1947/1987: 93). On what ground, after all, are this place and these amenities mine rather than another’s? In C. Katz & L. Trout (Eds. Von 1927 bis 1928 setzte er sein phänomenologisches Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press. Levinas uses the final paragraphs of “‘Dying for…’” to suggest a different perspective on death, sociality and their interrelation. Is it moreover not possible for a person to embrace her particularities without completely letting herself coincide with them, and without defining others solely on the basis of theirs? Time and the other (R. A. Cohen, Trans.). 239–262). 55–64). As Levinas accordingly declares: “The chosen home is the very opposite of a root” (1961/1969: 172). New York: Columbia University Press. ).Footnote 11 The self initially has no other company than the “wind, earth, sea, sky, air” (Levinas 1961/1969: 130); than what Levinas calls “the elemental” (1961/1969: 131). Compare the readings offered by, e.g., Cohen, arguing that Heidegger’s account of death, in contrast to Levinas’s, “left ethics and other persons behind as merely ontic or inauthentic” (2007: 34), and Thomson, explaining that the contrast is rather one between a self able “to establish the relatively continuous identity of itself and its community” (2015: 250) and a self more generally “dedicated to serving, eliciting, and respecting the alterity of other people” (2015: 259). On the philosophical reading of Heidegger: Situating the Black Notebooks. Let me therefore have a closer look at his thoughts on Dasein, death and authenticity. Être singulier pluriel. Levinas, E. (1947/1978). is derived from the totality,” as he puts it, and “[t]he unicity of each present is incessantly sacrificed to a future appealed to to bring forth its objective meaning” (1961/1969: 22). ), his account nonetheless brings him to depreciatingly speak of the Jews as a people without roots and history (1938-1939/2014: 96f. Albany: State University of New York Press. Having argued that Levinasian subjectivity, alterity and sociality can all be explained in terms of his aversion to Mitsein, I will now discuss another, seemingly opposing argument he makes against Heidegger. Fecundity and fraternity absorb neither self nor other(s), and to the extent that it binds them, this is not by similarity or identity but by an excess of responsibility that leaves their separation intact. This is moreover not just important for the debate about the continued relevance of Heidegger post-Notebooks, it is also of value for the philosophy of coexistence more generally. Hence, Totality and Infinity ends by offering an account of multipersonal relations that is, like the accounts of subjectivity and alterity given earlier in the book, radically different from Heideggerian Mitsein. From his earliest to his latest writings, Levinas frequently contrasts his philosophy, not only with the Heideggerian account of being, but also with the idea that there is no self outside of a specific socio-historical community. Judaism against paganism: Emmanuel Levinas’s response to Heidegger and Nazism in the 1930s. So while justice requires us to make “a comparison between incomparables” (Levinas 1974/1981: 16), we should nonetheless refrain from “[weaving] between the incomparables […] a unity, a community” (Levinas 1974/1981: 182). After offering accounts of self and other according to which they are absolutely singular, then, Levinas does place them within a larger interhuman setting. "TI, 181. For while one might think that unreservedly celebrating the multiplicity of cultures is the only moral thing to do, one forgets that “incomprehension, war, and conquest […] derive just as naturally from” (Levinas 1972/1987: 88) the juxtaposition of different cultures. Taminiaux, J. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press. Having seen to what extent Levinas is motivated by his allergy to being-with, let me explain in more detail how this is reflected in Levinas’s alternative account of human sociality. Stanford: Stanford University Press. For as Levinas points out: “The third party looks at me in the eyes of the Other” (1961/1969: 213).Footnote 14 As soon as I face responsibility for the destitute stranger, I can see the reflection of countless other others that are in equal need of my dedication. In the first half of Totality and Infinity, Levinas thus gives an explicitly egoistic account of selfhood, culminating in the subject retreating in its dwelling. Levinas more precisely argues that “[t]he woman”—“whose presence is discreetly an absence”—“is the condition for recollection, the interiority of the Home, and inhabitation” (1961/1969: 155). Plotinus: Towards an Ontology of Likeness (On the One and Nous). Simmons, W. (1999). Levinas, E. (1974/1981). Indeed, Levinas himself did not erase all signs of his own situatedness. Evanston: Northwestern University Press. It is rather Heideggerian rootedness that forms “the source of all cruelty towards men” because it results in “the very splitting of humanity into natives and strangers” (Levinas 1961/1990: 232): in a distinction between those who do and those who do not belong to a particular place or community and thus in a pitting of different groups of people against each other. Derrida once claimed that his work ‘would not have been possible without the opening of Heidegger’s questions.’ Equally, as peers, Derrida and Levinas commented on and critiqued each other’s work. The recent publication of Heidegger’s Black Notebooks have reignited the debate about the relationship between his philosophy and politics. Yet Heidegger goes on to explain that Fürsorge comes in several forms, one of which he explicitly describes as authentic.

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